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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the channels through which macroeconomic volatility prevents or hinders 
innovative investment undertakings financed by the domestic business sector. The analysis is based 
on a sample of 48 countries, representing all levels of development, and uses various measures of 
macroeconomic instability, such as political, real and monetary volatility. The results suggest a 
negative impact of macroeconomic instability on the share of R&D financed by the domestic 
business sector. These outcomes highlight the desirability of counter-cyclical policy interventions 
aiming to prevent the avoidance or abandonment of private R&D undertakings in unstable 
macroeconomic environments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of studies have dealt with the implications of macroeconomic volatility on macro-
performance.
1
 Some of these, in particular, have focused on the effects of macro-volatility on 
private investment activity, with sometime conflicting results (Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983; Dehn, 
2000; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; Bernanke, 1980; Federer, 1993; Serven, 2003, Aghion et al., 
2010). A few recent others have looked, in particular, at the link between macro-instability and 
innovative private investment, in the form of R&D expenditure (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; 
Goel and Ram, 1999; Saint-Paul, 2003; Rafferty, 2003a; Barlevy, 2005; Aghion et al., 2008; 
Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009). Conflicting results arise in this sub-set of the 
literature too. Most of the empirical studies among the latter take up a microeconometric approach, 
using firm-level data on private R&D investment, when empirically analysing the impact that 
volatility has on innovation. Alternatively, they focus on OECD countries only. This paper adopts, 
instead, a novel macroeconometric approach and constructs a comprehensive mixed dataset that 
includes both developed and developing countries. Our findings qualify the mixed results reported 
in the literature, on one hand, and disentangle the various components of the macro-volatility 
impact, on the other.
  
 
        The theoretical literature on uncertainty and investment can be broadly divided into two 
strands. Some studies describe the relationship between these two variables as positive (Hartman, 
1972; Abel, 1983; Dehn, 2000; Pindyck and Solimano,1993). Others posit that tighter credit 
constraints during recessions and the irreversibility of most investment projects - especially of 
                                            
1 Uncertainty and volatility are technically defined as two different concepts. However, it is common to find 
them used interchangeably in the literature and we will follow this convention hereafter. 
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innovative investment - turn this relationship negative (Bernanke, 1980; Federer, 1993; Goel and 
Ram, 1999; Aghion et al., 2010).
2
 In particular, Bernanke (1980) argues that a range of inaction is 
created in the presence of uncertainty, and that investment will not be undertaken until the moment 
when the cost of postponing it exceeds the value of the information gained by waiting. In addition, 
Goel and Ram (1999) show that the ‘degree’ of irreversibility of an investment project can change 
the impact of uncertainty: they find a much larger adverse effect on R&D investments, which are 
likely to be highly irreversible, than on non-R&D ones. In this sense, they argue that R&D 
investment entails expenditure on personnel, equipment and materials that is largely irreversible, 
owing to its project-specific and not merely firm-specific or industry-specific nature. This implies 
that it will be much more difficult, if not impossible, to dispose of the variable and fixed capital 
acquired in order to carry out a specific R&D project, in the face of adversities. Aghion et al. 
(2010) find that, when credit markets are imperfect and liquidity constraints are tight enough, long-
term investment will tend to be pro-cyclical.
3
  Other contributions place themselves somewhere in 
the middle: for instance, Sarkar (in Serven, 2003) maintains that the link between volatility and 
investment might exhibit threshold effects, with a positive relationship occurring at low uncertainty 
levels and a negative relationship taking place when the uncertainty level rises beyond a critical 
threshold.  
 
                                            
2 Uncertainty is defined as an increase in the variance of future return forecasts. The latter will be higher 
when the future maturity horizon of an investment is long and/or when it is uncertain, which is particularly 
the case in R&D investments. Furthermore, investing in the proximity of the technological frontier requires 
plenty of funds and firms worry equally about probability of success and size of the investment (Canitrot, in 
Katz, 1987). 
3 The authors explicitly identify R&D investment as a long-term type of investment. 
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       A more recent, although more limited, number of contributions analyze the impact of volatility 
on ‘innovative’ investment. This literature can again be divided into two main strands, depending 
on whether they maintain that R&D investment follows a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical response 
pattern to macroeconomic fluctuations. It is crucial for policy-makers to determine which one 
holds.  In other words, as put forward in Blackburn (1999), if business cycles increase inventive 
activity, a policy attempt to smooth out the business cycle might reduce productivity growth and 
long-run growth. But if business cycles decrease inventive activity, then attempts to smooth out the 
business cycles can improve productivity growth and long-run growth. Those that argue in favor of 
a pro-cyclical response pattern maintain that a ‘cash-flow’ effect exists, which financially 
constrains firms’ activities and hinders the undertaking of innovative investment during downturns 
(Rafferty, 2003a; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Aghion et al., 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009, Aghion 
et al., 2010). Barlevy (2005) adds to this that, although credit constraints certainly account for part 
of the pro-cyclicality, knowledge spillover effects play their part too. In particular, diffusion and 
implementation by imitators tends to takes place during recessions when the time to reverse 
engineer the spllied-over idea before next boom is longer. Therefore, private innovators will refrain 
from incurring spillover risks and will tend to invest in R&D during booms instead. Those that 
support the counter-cyclicality of R&D investment suggest downturns influence resource allocation 
at the firm level according to ‘opportunity-cost’ criteria (see Saint-Paul, 1993). Specifically, 
recessions lower expected sales; as a consequence, the opportunity cost of undertaking R&D 
activities, in terms of foregone profits, is lowered as well. Therefore, firms will find it profitable to 
allocate resources to R&D during recessions and to the shop-floor during expansions. This 
approach is informed by the Schumpeterian view of the business cycle and by Hall’s 
reorganizational capital theory (1991). According to both, recessions have a cleansing role as they 
encourage firms to restructure, replace and innovate. Nonetheless, on one hand, Aghion and Saint-
Paul (1998) specify that the latter set-up only holds when productivity enhancing investment is 
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costly but does not interfere with current production activities. In fact, when the costs are higher 
and may disrupt current production, pro-cyclicality holds instead. Furthermore, Aghion et al. 
(2008) and Rafferty and Funk (2008) show that the existence of an asymmetry in binding 
constraints causes cash-flow constraints to bind more during recessions than expansions. This 
results in firms’ disinvestment during recessions being greater than their increase in investment 
during expansions. Likewise, the ‘opportunity-cost’ effect is shown to bind more during booms 
than slumps. As a result, firms will tend to relocate resources away from R&D and towards the 
productive compartment when positive demand shocks occur, but the opposite is unlikely to 
happen (to the same extent), during negative demand shocks.  Relying on the same methodology 
used by Aghion et al. (2008), Bohva-Padilla et al. (2009) additionally prove that both pro-
cyclicality and counter-cyclicality of R&D are confirmed. The first, however, is more likely to hold 
for small and medium-sized firms, which tend to experience binding credit constraints the most; 
whereas, the second characterises non-credit constrained firms, such as MNCs or subsidised firms. 
It follows, therefore, that for small and/or credit-constrained firms, as well as for all enterprises 
exposed to the negative impact of downturns, counter-cyclical mechanisms need to be in place in 
order to maintain their incentive to innovate. In this respect, when taking a closer look at the 
summary statistics (see Table 1 below) for the data used in this analysis, a pattern behind the 
relation between public and private R&D spending is apparent. With few exceptions, in developed 
countries, the share of public R&D spending is lower than (or just as big as) the private share; 
whereas in developing countries, (often very) low levels of business spending in research and 
development are always accompanied by higher levels of government spending.
4
  
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
                                            
4 China, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela constitute somewhat of an 
exception. 
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This evidence inevitably raises the question of whether the domestic private sector refrains from 
engaging in high-returns R&D investment projects because they are too risky in uncertain 
macroeconomic environments. This paper seeks to answer exactly this question, while bearing in 
mind two extrinsic characteristics of R&D investment. First, innovation is a risky, long-term-
maturity, high-budget type of investment, and, as such, it is likely to be largely influenced by 
uncertainty in the surrounding macroeconomic environment. Second, small and medium-sized 
firms, particularly in developing countries, are likely to be credit constrained, especially during 
recessionary spells. They are therefore likely to be hindered in their innovative attempts in 
uncertain macro-environments. 
 
        As previously mentioned, most of the studies described above that perform and empirical 
analysis take up a microeconometric approach, using firm-level data on private R&D investment. 
Alternatively, they focus on OECD countries only, due to the well-known scarcity of R&D data 
availability for developing countries (Goel and Ram, 1999; Aghion et al., 2010; Agénor and 
Neanidis, 2011). As a result, a comprehensive analysis that adopts a macroeconometric approach 
and considers developing countries as well as developed countries does not exist to the author’s 
knowledge, which is what this paper seeks to do in what follows. The contribution of this paper is 
not, therefore, limited to the new focus adopted for the empirical analysis. It also extends to the 
mixed dataset utilised for the empirical analyis, which has been constructed by integrating private 
sector R&D expenditure data from various sources and databases..
5
 A final contribution of our 
paper is the estimation of a multi-dimensional set of volatility indices. Specifically, to represent the 
multiple aspects in which instability of the macroeconomic environment manifests itself, we utilise 
a number of proxies for real, monetary and political instability. We show that they all have a 
                                            
5
 Details of the dataset composition process are presented in Section 2 below. 
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negative impact on private innovation incentives. But in addition to this, we also disentangle the 
individual effect that each one of these components has when all volatility indices are estimated at 
the same time. Such findings, in light of the considerations previously exposed, uncover the 
necessity of public policy interventions in support of private firms engaging in innovation in 
volatile macro-environments. Such interventions should aim at preventing the abandonment or 
avoidance of private R&D investment undertakings as a consequence of macro-uncertainty. In this 
way, these policies can allow for continuity both in private future profitability horizons and, as a 
result, in national growth and development paths. 
  
        The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the econometric analysis method, 
the variables and the data. The results along with the robustness analysis are described in section 3 
and 4; while, section 5 illustrates some policy implications and concludes. Finally, the data sources, 
the country list and all methodological considerations appear in Appendix A and B. 
 
2. MODEL AND DATA 
 
The econometric analysis aims to test the various claims made in the literature as to the direction 
and size of the impact that macro-volatility has on private R&D investment: firstly, it uncovers the 
nature of such impact and all its sub-components. Secondly, it assesses the magnitude of such 
impact; and thirdly, it tests and confirms the robustness of the results, while also comparing and 
contrasting the differences existing between developing and developed countries. The choice of 
regressors included in the model specification has taken into account and sought comparison with a 
variety of stability/instability indicators used in the literature, and it includes various control 
variables which have been used by the literature on the determinants of innovative investment.  
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The dataset used for this analysis has been constructed by merging various databases reporting 
measures of business R&D for both developed and developing countries (OECD STI, UNESCO 
S&T, RICYT – see Appendix A for details). 6 As a result, our panel covers 15 years, from 1994 to 
2008, and 66 countries, so that the maximum sample would include 956 observations. Due to 
missing data, however, the actual estimated panel is reduced to 48 countries and 288 observations. 
Sub-Saharan African countries, excluding Uganda and South Africa, do not collect secondary data 
on innovation at all. Therefore, the panel suffers from an underrepresentation of African countries 
that needs to be acknowledged. All the sources used for the collection of the dataset and the 
country list are shown in Appendix A.  
 
The benchmark econometric specification is as follows: 
 
 
(1) 
 
where the dependent variable, yit, is BusinessR&D, the share of investment in R&D financed by the 
domestic business sector, calculated as a % of GDP. The right hand side of the regression includes 
a vector of time-invariant country fixed effects, αi, a vector of time-varying common effects, δt,, 
                                            
6
 Correspondence of measurement units has been ensured and discrepancies have been solved prior to the 
dataset merge. This has been achieved by making sure the overlapping sections of the various databases were 
rebased in the currency denomination year of the one that contained the most variables. Moreover, the unit of 
measurement has been homogenized across the various sources and million dollars have been used as the 
base unit. Finally, where data discrepancies were encountered, the formally identical data definition has been 
explored in detail to subtract the components which made measures different in practice.  
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and the error component εit. The Xj,it-2 and Ζl,it vectors contain, respectively, lagged endogenous 
control variables and exogenous control variables in levels. These represent standard R&D 
investment determinants commonly used in the literature surrounding the micro and 
macroeconomic determinants of innovation. Finally, the vector of Vm,it is formed by volatility 
measures, the impact of which is the object of this analysis.  
 
Domestic private R&D spending has been chosen as the dependent variable to examine whether 
economy-wide fluctuations affect the incentive and willingness of the private sector to invest in 
innovation. Developing countries, in particular, suffer from lack of innovative entrepreneurial 
undertakings, in absolute terms, but especially when these are compared to the share of innovation 
carried out by the public sector. The latter has therefore been included in the first vector of our 
regression specification presented above, that is, Xj,it-2. To be more specific, the share of publicly 
financed R&D, GoverR&D, is included to account for the role of public tangible and intangible 
infrastructure and to verify whether its impact on private R&D spending has a complementary 
effect or points towards the existence of a crowding out effect. As public and private R&D can be 
co-determined, GoverR&Dt-2 enters the regression in the form of its second lag; which serves to 
correct for the potential endogeneity bias on its coefficient. The same applies to all the other 
variables contained in Xj,it-2: their own second lag is used as an instrument in order to correct for the 
potential simultaneity bias. The other variables included in this vector are LogGDPt-2, that is, GDP 
per capita (in logs), and its interaction with the dummy HI.
7
 This takes the value of 1 if the country 
is a high-income country, according to the World Bank Atlas classification system, and zero 
                                            
7
 The relevance of human capital and educational levels for the innovation process has been highlighted by 
both theory (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) and empirics 
(Wang, 2010). The reason why such a variable is excluded from our analysis is due to its high correlation 
with GDP. 
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otherwise.
8
 GDP per capita is included to control for the level of development of the countries in 
our panel. Its interaction term, LogGDPhit-2, on the other hand, has been included to control for the 
possible non-linearity of the relationship between the level of development of an economy and its 
private innovative spending.
9
  
 
        The Zl,it vector contains exogenous control variables which represent commonly used 
determinants of private R&D spending. One of these is the real interest rate, IntRate
10
. The use of 
the latter as a determinant of investment is rather common (Rafferty, 2003b; Aghion et al., 2008; 
Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009; Becker and Pain, 2003; 
Escaleras&Thomakos, 2008). The interest rate considered is the lending interest rate charged to 
businesses by commercial banks, with a maturity of 3 months to 1 year. The choice of this type of 
interest rate over the short term rate (1 month to 3 months) or long term rate (around 10 years) aims 
to target medium-term investment decision dynamics. A measure of trade openness (TradeOpen), 
calculated as the sum of exports and imports as a % of GDP, is also included. We expect this 
variable to have an impact related to the contribution of international exchange to the ease and pace 
of innovation and technological progress. This variable has been included in previous studies and 
tested as one amongst the most relevant determinants of innovative investment (Smolny, 2003; 
Sameti et al., 2010).  Finally, this vector also contains ExchRate, the nominal exchange rate level, 
together with the interaction between the latter and an EMU dummy, which takes the value of one 
only for those countries which joined the European Monetary Union (EMU), in the year they 
                                            
8
 The list of HI countries is available in Appendix A 
9 This hypothesis of a non-linear pattern is confirmed by a visual inspection of the data in our sample and by 
a plot of LogGDPt-2 against BusinessR&D. In particular, the plot suggests that the positive effect of the level 
of development on private innovation sets in after a certain income threshold and only exists in HI countries.  
10 Its square, IntRateSq, is also included to capture potential non-linear effects. 
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switched currency regime. The level variable is meant to take into account the impact of a currency 
appreciation/depreciation on the level of innovative investment performed. Such indirect impact 
would be brought about by changes in export and/or import capacities, to which the considerations 
on TradeOpen also apply. The interaction, instead, controls for the structural break taking place 
when the EMU regime is adopted, by correcting for the switch in measurement units.
11
 
 
        Finally, theVm,it vector contains various measures of volatility that cover and proxy for all 
aspects of macroeconomic instability. They represent indicators of volatility associated with real, 
monetary, and political variables which are thought to proxy for the overall soundness of the 
macroeconomic environment. Specifically, the Vm,it vector contains: a measure of overall 
government deficit/surplus, named Balance. Balance proxies for the quality of public account 
management. While, strictly speaking, this does not represent a coefficient of instability, it does 
give a measure of fiscal reliability, and it has been used in other studies in the same way (Burnside 
and Dollar, 2000; Fisher, 1993). In other words, the way a government keeps its finances, 
accumulates its debt load, and maintains the manageability of its budget are all indicators of the 
soundness and reliability of its policies. PolInstab is an indicator of political and institutional 
stability named ‘State Fragility Index’ in the Polity IV database. The index is constructed as a 
weighted average of various political legitimacy and economic effectiveness indicators. In 
particular, its score is higher for countries where the occurrence of wars, coups d’état and short-
lasting political regimes is more frequent. The reason for including a measure of political stability 
among the volatility proxies is because political regime changes influence the macroeconomic 
                                            
11
 Most EMU countries joined the currency union in 1999; the rest of the EMU countries in our sample have 
joined the union between 2001 and 2007. When the switch takes place LCU denominated exchange rates turn 
to euro denominations, therefore the EMU dummy is needed to take into account the break and to avoid 
biasing the estimation. 
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environment as a whole, by switching policy, tax and incentive regimes; and by shifting around 
economic targets and priorities at the national level (Fosu, 1992; Alesina et al., 1996). Also, more 
so in developing countries where this happens rather openly, corruption and rent-seeking behaviors 
influence the allocation of resources (Alesina et al., 1996): if the group/coalition in power changes, 
the whole network of interactions, resource allocation and power relations can change, thereby 
bringing an abrupt alteration in investment profitability and opportunities. It follows that when the 
macroeconomic and political environment is so unstable that economic fundamentals and signals 
turn uncertain too, individuals are likely to refrain from high-budget, long maturity horizon 
investments such as R&D. The vector also includes ad hoc measures of real and monetary 
volatility, which have been constructed using the coefficient of variation of real interest rate 
(IntRateCoV), exchange rate (ExchRateCoV), and GDP per capita (LogGDPCoV). The volatility of 
the interest rate, along with that of the exchange rate, is used to proxy for the volatility of the 
monetary policy framework. In particular, unexpected changes and high variability in the interest 
rate influence the cost of capital, whereas fluctuations in the exchange rate affect the export/import 
incentives of a firm. Furthermore, abrupt changes in these variables capture the occurrences of 
crises: the strong impact the latter have on overall economic activity will be inevitably reflected on 
the levels of private investment. Moreover, the volatility of the exchange rate is also used to proxy 
for the level of international volatility. In particular, this is meant to capture the fact that a great 
part of the innovation performed in developing countries is not sold domestically. Once again, the 
interaction between the volatility of the nominal exchange rate and the EMU dummy 
(ExchRateCoVEmu) controls for the structural break induced by the European Union membership, 
as explained in the above section. In this case, however, the interaction is used to measure and 
account for the increased stability that the introduction of the common currency regime has 
introduced in the nominal exchange rate levels of the EMU countries. Finally, the volatility of GDP 
per capita is intended to proxy for the instability in the real sector of the economy. In other words, 
13 
 
the coefficient on this volatility index measures the variability in the level of overall savings and 
aggregate demand. Therefore, we would expect private investment to decrease during downturns as 
a consequence of a detrimental impact of real volatility. Note, however, that Schumpeter-inspired 
creative destruction theories maintain the opposite, on the grounds we have exposed in the previous 
section. 
 
        A great part of the literature agrees now on the coefficient of variation (C.o.V.) being a more 
robust indicator with respect to the standard deviation; as not only the latter is an absolute measure, 
but it also is very sensitive to noise in the data (see Mobarak, 2005; Klomp & de Haan, 2009). To 
the contrary, the division by the mean implied by the C.o.V. creates a discounted relative measure, 
which allows to take into account co-movements between similar countries, due for example to the 
effect of common business cycle patterns (Klomp & de Haan, 2009).
12
 Nonetheless, there is still 
much controversy as to which of the two measures is more appropriate when different variable 
specifications are used. For this reason, we test the results’ robustness using the C.o.V. first, and, 
then, the standard deviation.  
 
        Macroeconomic volatility does not enter the regression specification in lagged form because it 
is unlikely that such a small component of GDP such as innovative investment financed by the 
private sector can cause real, monetary, and/or political instability. All the other variables are 
divided, as already said, in endogenous and exogenous ones. Just to reiterate, for the former, their 
own second lag has been used as a way of instrumentation. This choice has been made both in the 
simple Fixed Effects (FE) model, which we estimate first, and in the 2SLS-FE model, which 
constitutes our chosen estimation technique. In the next section, the results of the simple FE panel 
are followed by those of the 2SLS-FE panel, in order to compare the gains in terms of unbiasedness 
                                            
12 Appendix B contains technical details on the construction of these volatility measures.  
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achieved by means of the second technique. To be more specific, the FE model only deals with 
time invariant country specific fixed effects and, in that context, we take care of the endogeneity of 
the Xj,it-2 vector variables by lagging (second lag) all the variable contained in the vector. In the 
2SLS-FE panel, instead, the advantages of the fixed effects methodology are coupled with a 
different instrumentation technique. The latter is structured in two stages of estimation and the 
entire set of exogenous (or internal) instruments, that is, the lagged variables, is used to proxy for 
the whole set of endogenous variables. Whereas all the exogenous variables in vector Zl,it  are used 
as instruments for themselves (external instruments). 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
 The benchmark regression reported in equation (1) is estimated in its basic, more parsimonious, 
form first and then in its extended form when all volatility indices are included. The results of the 
FE estimator are reported in Table 2, while the results of the 2SLS - FE estimator appear in Table 
3. We start with column (1) of Table 2, which reports the results of the most basic regression 
specification estimated, that includes: GDP per capita and its HI interaction, public R&D, the 
interest rate and its square, the exchange rate and its EMU interaction, trade openness and budget 
deficit. Subsequently, as we move to the next columns, real volatility, monetary volatility and 
political instability indices are added one at a time in each set of results; this is done in order to 
examine their individual as well as their joint effect on private innovative spending. Column (5) 
appears in bold type because it reports our benchmark regression specification as detailed in 
equation (1). 
 
[Table 2 about here]  
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As we can see in Table 2, the non-interacted level of development is never significant, regardless of 
the regression specification being estimated, whereas LogGDPhit-2 takes on the expected positive 
sign. One possible interpretation of this result is that the level of a country’s economic development 
is relevant when explaining private innovate investment only after a certain threshold value of GDP 
per capita. GoverR&Dt-2 also has a positive sign and retains its high significance throughout the 
estimation set, a result which points in the direction of a complementary rather than a crowding out 
effect of public R&D. This result confirms the findings of Becker and Pain (2003) and Sameti et al. 
(2010). The real interest rate shows a negative but diminishing effect on innovative investment. 
This is to be expected if the interest rate is taken to represent the cost of borrowing capital by 
private enterprises. The level of the nominal exchange rate as well as its interaction with the EMU 
dummy are never significant, and equally insignificant turns out to be the volatility of the exchange 
rate and the interaction term of the latter with EMU, as shown in column (4) and (5). The degree of 
openness to trade has a positive and significant impact on BusinessR&D at the 10% level. This 
result is in line with both the empirical literature (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010; Wang, 2010) 
and the theoretical literature (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) that shows how 
international openness is likely to result in a positive impact on technological progress, due to 
increased external exposure and interaction. Turning to the examination of the instability 
indicators, Balance has a very highly significant positive impact on BusinessR&D. The magnitude 
of this impact increases further as we move from left to right in the table and reaches the highest 
value in the last two specifications of column (4) and (5). In light of the considerations made 
above, we can interpret this coefficient to signify that in our panel there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between improved fiscal performance and innovative investment. Moving our attention 
now to the C.o.V. macro-volatility indices, column (2) reports the results of the inclusion of real 
volatility only. LogGDPCoV enters the regression with a negative sign, as expected, and an 
absolute coefficient of 0.1, which actually increases in both significance and magnitude as more 
16 
 
volatility indices get added and reaches 0.18 in column (5). A sizably lower but still very 
significant and negative impact is born by the monetary volatility index, IntRateCoV, and by the 
political instability index, PolInstabI.
13
 
  
        All these results remain substantially the same when endogeneity is taken into account, via the 
use of 2SLS with fixed effects (Table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In fact, the lack of significance of the estimate on LogGDPt-2 carries over to this analysis, as well as 
the very strong positive impact that the level of development has on private R&D spending when 
interacted with HI. The one result that is cconsiderably different from the simple FE set of results is 
the coefficient of GoverR&Dt-2, which from about 0.2 in Table 2 reaches a coefficient of 0.82 in the 
benchmark regression specification in column (5). In particular, the coefficient on public R&D 
indicates that a 0.5% increase in the latter will lead to a 0.41% increase in private R&D spending, 
which is quite high, considering that the average private spending in R&D in the developing 
countries subsample of our study is of about 1.12% of their GDP (see Table 1). The impact of the 
interest rate and that of the exchange rate and its interaction with EMU carry over from Table 2. 
The same stands for the impact of ExchRateCoV and its interaction term ExchRateEMU. Note that 
the lack of significance of such variables in our sample is reflected in the literature; where much of 
the evidence on the relationship between exchange rate regimes and export volumes is rather 
inconclusive (see Wang and Barrett, 2007 for a review). TradeOpen, on the other hand, appears to 
have again a quite substantial positive impact on private innovation. In our panel, 0.5% increase in 
                                            
13 A quantitative interpretation of the C.o.V. indices is given in the next paragraph, when the results of the 
2SLS-FE preferred estimation technique are described. 
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trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports over total GDP, leads to a 0.11% 
increase in BusinessR&D. The coefficient of Balance, once again, confirms the importance of the 
quality of the macroeconomic environment for innovative undertakings by the private sector. The 
estimates of the 2SLS model suggest that a 1% increase in surplus (or decrease in deficit) lead to a 
0.02% increase in innovation spending. It is easier to appreciate the magnitude of this impact if one 
considers that the value of BusinessR&D in our sample ranges between a minimum of 0.000028% 
and a maximum of 3.40% of GDP (Table 1). Due to the way in which the C.o.V. is calculated (see 
Appendix B below for details), it is not possible to interpret in terms of elasticity the coefficients on 
our volatility indices. They can, however, be interpreted in the following way: the increase in one 
standard deviation of the real volatility coefficient of variation results in a decrease of about 0.2% 
points in private R&D spending. In the case of monetary volatility, as proxied by the C.o.V. of the 
real interest rate, one standard deviation increase in the C.o.V. of IntRateCoV leads to a decrease of 
0.012% points in BusinessR&D, which is a sizably lower impact when compared to that of real 
volatility and is roughly the same figure as that appearing in Table 2.  These results are in line with 
the findings of the microeconometric literature reported above (Rafferty, 2003a; Aghion et al., 
2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009), which reports a negative impact of 
both real and monetary volatility on the R&D spending financed by the firms considered in their 
panels. Finally, PolInstab, also appears with a very similar coefficient to the one estimated using 
simple FE. That is, a 1 point increase in political instability as measured by the Polity IV “State 
Failure Index” which ranges from 0 to 21, leads to a 0.027% decrease in BusinessR&D. This type 
of relationship is in line with the results of Barro (1991), Fosu (1992), Alesina et al. (1996), and 
Fosu (2003), who have empirically shown that a negative relation exists between political 
instability and economic growth. Our results also reflects the arguments put forward by Rodrik 
(1989) and by Fanelli and Frenkel (1995), who warn that the biggest risk implied by political 
instability lays in their recurrence and persistence, which lead economic agents to change 
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expectations and behaviors as a response. In particular, Rodrik (1989) shows that uncertainty on 
policy stability acts as a tax on investment. In fact, expectations are based on the subjective 
probability attached to policy reversal and on the magnitude of investment irreversibility. The 
former is very high in developing countries, while the latter is very high for R&D investment. This 
combination is therefore likely to be the cause of the detrimental impact that political instability has 
on BusinessR&D in our findings. 
 
        It has to be emphasised that all volatility measures, with the exception of the exchange rate 
volatility index, appear in the result set with robustly negative coefficients, and this holds 
regardless of whether they are tested on their own or jointly. Indeed, their magnitude increases with 
the inclusion of additional volatility indices and controls. Furthermore, they retain their 
significance across the different estimation techniques and regression specification sets, despite the 
inclusion of time controls, which are used to correct for the effect of both common shocks and the 
business cycle.
14
 
 
4. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
In order to check the robustness of these findings, we, firstly, test the same model of the benchmark 
regression in column (5) of Table 3 using the standard deviation as an indicator of volatility rather 
than the coefficient of variation. Secondly, we include a number of additional controls to the 
benchmark model in order to verify whether the coefficients of our volatility measures retain the 
same type of impact. And, finally, we restrict the sample to a set of high-income countries, so as to 
examine the differential impact that volatility has on the amount of private spending in R&D, 
                                            
14
 Also note that LogGDPCoV is the volatility of the log of GDP per capita, and not of GDP per capita in 
levels. However, even with this specification, the effect of real volatility is highly significant. 
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conditional on a higher level of economic development. This is done because higher levels of 
economic development are likely to be also reflected in lower financial constraints, more developed 
financial markets and better ability of the private sector to cope with volatility and recessions, or 
even its capacity to benefit from such fluctuations. As anticipated, the latter hypothesis has been 
put forward by part of the literature reported above (Hartman, 1972; Abel,1983; Dehn, 2000; 
Pindyck and Solimano,1993) and by various Schumpeter-inspired creative destruction theories 
(Hall, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1993). 
 
        Starting with the model where the standard deviation has been substituted to the coefficient of 
variation, we are going to focus our attention on column (1) of Table 4 first.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results show now that both LogGDPt-2 and LogGDPhit-2 are significant, albeit of different sign, 
pointing in the direction of a negative effect of very low levels of development on innovative 
investment by the private sector. Public sector spending in R&D retains its positive coefficient and 
its beneficial impact on the amount of innovative spending financed by the business sector. All the 
results previously reported with regards to the interest rate and its square, exchange rate levels and 
their EMU interaction term remain intact. The same stands for both TradeOpen and Balance. When 
real, monetary and international volatilities are measured with the standard deviation coefficient 
rather than with the coefficient of variation, all three measures are significant. In fact, when the 
standard deviation of the exchange rate level is used, the latter gains significance as opposed to the 
lack of impact of its C.o.V. measure. However, precisely for the latter reason, this result cannot be 
considered as robust. In addition, the finding seems to be counter-intuitive as it suggests that a 
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depreciation will decrease innovative investment.
15
 This can be interpreted to represent the import-
intensive nature of innovation in developing countries. In other words, lower purchasing power of a 
developing country’s currency will result in decreased capital good and input imports. This will in 
turn lead to lower innovative investment. Both LogGDPStDev and IntRateStDev, instead, retain 
their significance and negative relationship with private R&D spending, even though the magnitude 
of both volatility coefficients is now smaller when compared to the results of column (5) in Table 
3. Finally, the index of Political Instability retains its significance and appears with a slightly 
increased coefficient magnitude. 
 
        Moving now to column (2) of Table 4, we present the set of results deriving from the inclusion 
of a number of additional regressors. Democracy is taken from the same Polity IV dataset from 
which PolInstab is taken. This indicator attaches a score of 10 to very democratic countries and 0 
to autocratic regimes. This control is meant to proxy for the quality of institutions; however, it 
appears to be insignificantly different from zero. Such result could be a sign of political instability 
being a more important determinant of investors’ confidence and willingness to fund innovation 
projects than the quality of the institutional background. In other words, the degree of democracy 
vs. autocracy prevailing in an economy could be related in multiple ways to R&D investment, 
depending on what goals institutional actors are set to achieve and on what type of policies they use 
to do so. However, it is the instability in this institutional framework, and the probability of 
discontinuation of such policies, what is likely to have a detrimental impact on the undertaking and 
continuation of long-term maturity, high-budget investment projects. A measure of property rights 
protection is also included; which is an index constructed by Economic Freedom of the World 
                                            
15 For evidence of a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on agricultural productivity, see Barrett et al. 
(2006). For evidence of a positive relation between exchange rate volatility and overall fixed investment, see 
Escaleras and Thomakos (2008).  
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(EFW). This control is added to test whether physical and intellectual property right security has 
any impact on the amount of innovative investment undertaken by the business sector. The 
insignificance of this type of measure, reported in column (2) for our sample, is debatable; 
nonetheless it confirms Wang’s (2010) results in his analysis of the determinants of fixed 
investment. Finally, a variable measuring the amount of high-tech exports as a percentage of 
overall GDP has also been included. This variable has been instrumented with its second lag to 
account for its likely endogeneity. We would expect the quantity of high-tech exports to be 
positively related to the amount of innovation performed by the exporting country. However, once 
again this control appears with an insignificant coefficient in column (2). This could be due to the 
fact that not all developing countries where a high percentage of high-tech exports is recorded do 
actually invest more in innovation. In many cases (think of Mexico), it is only outsourcing, Export 
Protection Zone agreements, and the like what accounts for the high volumes of technological 
goods exports. As a result, the relationship between HtExpt-2 and BusinessR&D can be blurry, 
something which is reflected in our own findings. With regards to the impact these additional 
control variables have had on our volatility measures, it is possible to see from column (2) of Table 
4 that their significance and their magnitude has actually increased following the inclusion of these 
new regressors. A result that further confirms the robustness of the set of volatility indicators. 
 
         Finally, column (3) reports the results of the benchmark regression estimated on a panel of 
OECD economies. This reduced panel covers a longer period: 28 years, from 1981 to 2008, it 
counts 22 countries and sums up to 321 observations. As anticipated, this is done in order to 
estimate the impact of volatility conditional on the different development level attained by this 
high-income group of countries. An additional implication of this test is that it allows to assess 
whether the type of production landscape - and especially the size of the enterprises forming this 
landscape - influences the impact that volatility has on the share of domestic private R&D 
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spending. Such hypothesis has been tested by part of the previously reported literature (Rafferty 
and Funk, 2008; Aghion et al., 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009), and the results shown in Column 
(3) are in line with both the main findings of this literature and with the strand of literature that 
posits the pro-cyclicality of innovative investment (see Saint-Paul, 2003). In particular, the positive 
coefficient exhibited by real volatility, LogGDPCoV, lends some evidence to the arguments 
inscribed in the Schumpeterian creative destruction theoretical framework. The monetary volatility 
index, represented by IntRateCoV, retains its negative impact, which is even higher in this panel 
than in the mixed panel. This can be attributed to the fact that financial markets are much more 
developed in high-income countries, where monetary markets retain higher levels of flexibility and 
responsiveness. The positive sign exhibited by the levels of real interest rate, instead, seems 
puzzling at first sight. However, in light of the fact that this panel is very homogeneous and that in 
developed countries the risk attached to investment is much lower, this result can be interpreted to 
represent the rate of return on investment projects. A new indicator of political instability, Xconst, 
measures the degree of constraints put on the executive at the institutional level.
16
 It attaches a 
higher score to more democratic countries, where the executive power is limited by other 
authorities and a score of zero to autocratic regimes. Because both the degree of democracy and the 
institutional background setting are broadly homogenous among all countries contained in this HI 
panel, the coefficient on this variable turns out to be insignificant. A result which is likely to be due 
to the lack of variation in the data. Some similar considerations can be made with regards to the 
level of development. In fact, the coefficient of LogGDPt-2 appears to be non-significantly different 
from zero. This result is again probably attributable to the fact that there is very little variation in 
the level of personal income in the countries contained in this sample. An interesting result is the 
                                            
16
 PolInstab could not be used in this regression due to the different time coverage of the HI sub-sample. As 
already mentioned, the HI panel starts in 1981, whereas the ‘State Fragility Index’ by Polity IV only covers 
the years from 1994 onwards. 
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fact that, even in this sample, the amount of public R&D spending financed by the government 
retains a positive impact on BusinessR&D, with a magnitude similar and comparable to that 
reported in the mixed panel regression table (Table 3). TradeOpen has not been included in this 
regression due to the fact that all high-income countries in this panel are internationally open to the 
same degree. Balance, on the other hand, turns insignificant, which is likely to be due to the higher 
confidence investors place in public finances of developed countries. The level of ExchRate now 
has a positive impact on BusinessR&D. While its coefficient is not very high in economic terms, its 
significance lends mild evidence to the familiar dynamic whereby export expansions follow 
currency depreciations (see Wang and Barrett, 2007, for a similar argument).  
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has sought to study the impact of macroeconomic instability on private innovative 
investment in the form of R&D. The innovation of the paper has been threefold. Firstly, a 
comprehensive mixed developed-developing economies panel has been constructed. Secondly, 
various indices of real, monetary, and political instability have been tested according to various 
econometric and economic specifications. Their negative impact on private R&D spending has 
been shown to be not only robust, but also insensitive to the inclusion of additional controls and to 
changes in the measurement procedure. Thirdly, the macro-instability indices retain their 
significance both when tested individually and when tested jointly, allowing us in this way to 
disentangle the individual effect of each of the various macro-instability components. 
 
        It has been argued that lack of private R&D investment is likely to result in low levels of 
growth and development. The question of why the domestic private sector of developing countries 
is neglecting innovation, and therefore failing to reap the high-returns of this type of investment 
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activity, has been asked at the outset. Innovation has been classified as a high-budget, long maturity 
horizon type of investment. Due to these features, uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment 
has been suggested as a potential answer for the lack of private R&D investment engagement 
exhibited by most developing countries in our sample.  As mentioned above, the econometric 
findings reported in this paper support such hypothesis and suggest three ways in which macro-
volatility can affect R&D investment. In particular, political instability, real volatility and monetary 
volatility are shown to have a negative impact on the share of R&D financed by the domestic 
business sector in a mixed panel of 48 countries. Subsequently, it has also been shown that, when 
the same estimation is performed on a sample of high-income countries, only monetary volatility 
retains a negative impact, while the coefficient of the real volatility measure is positive and signals 
the presence of creative destruction effects in our sample.  
 
        The above results highlight the need for counter-cyclical policy interventions aiming to 
prevent the avoidance or abandonment of R&D investment by developing countries’ domestic 
firms. Vidal (2008) reports in her study of the entrepreneurial sector in Latin American countries 
that half of the businesses in the region fails to survive the set-up phase, and shows how 
abandonment of investment projects is as important a problem as the avoidance of investment 
altogether. Moreover, Rodrik (1989), after defining investment failure as ‘investment reversal’, 
shows in his calculations that when investment irreversibility amounts to three-quarters of the cost 
of installed capital, a 20% investment reversal probability due to instability calls for a 15% point 
public investment subsidy. The latter is needed to offset the losses due to uncertainty and it is 
necessary to keep alive both the investment profitability and the incentive to innovate. In 
conclusion, a policy implication which is possible to draw from this study is that if avoidance 
and/or abandonment of innovative projects are to be prevented in the face of uncertainty, policy 
interventions should follow a counter-cyclical pattern. In other words, they should aim at 
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smoothing out downturns and at providing complementary infrastructure and R&D spending when 
negative shocks hit. This would guarantee a continuity of cash flows and return opportunities over 
time to firms engaging in innovation in unstable macroeconomic environments. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
I. DATA SOURCES 
BUSINESS R&D 
Share of total R&D spending (%) financed 
by the private sector  
 
 
OECD.Stat Main Science and 
Technology Incidators (MSTI - 2010) 
UNESCO UIS Science&Technology 
(S&T - 2010) 
Red Indicadores Ciencias 
YTecnologia (RICYT - 2009) 
 
GOVERNMENT R&D 
Share of total R&D spending (%) financed 
by the public sector 
  OECD.Stat MSTI Database (2010) 
UNESCO UIS (2010) 
RICYT (2009) 
 
GDP PER CAPITA 
 
GDP/midyear population. Data are in 
constant 2000 US$ 
 
   World Bank-WDI (2010) 
 
INFLATION RATE Rate of Inflation (CPI based) 
 
IMF - International Financial Series 
(IFS, 2010) 
 
 
REAL INTEREST RATE 
 
Lending Interest Rate minus Inflation Rate 
 
WDI and IMF’s IFS series--Author’s               
calculation 
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE 
RATE 
Exchange Rate value (LCU per US$) 
 
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
IMF - International Financial Series 
(IFS, 2010) 
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BALANCE  Overall Deficit/Surlpus (%GDP) 
IMF – Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS, 2009) 
EXPORTS/IMPORTS 
 
Trade (% GDP) 
 
    
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
OECD National Account Stats (2010) 
DEMOCRACY 
I 
ndex of Democracy that takes the value of 
10 for very democratic countries and 0 
when the institutions are very authoritarian 
 
   POLITY IV Dataset (2010) 
STATE FRAGILITY  
INDEX 
Index based on state legitimacy, political 
instability and economic effectiveness. It 
takes the value of 21 for very unstable 
political environments and 0 for very 
stable ones 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2009) 
 
XCONST 
 
Institutional Constraints on the Executive. 
It takes the value of 7 for countries where 
the power of the executive is constrained 
by institutional mechanisms and 0 when 
the government is very authoritarian 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2010) 
 
HIGH-TECH EXPORTS 
 
Share of High-Tech exports over GDP 
 
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PROTECTION INDEX 
Indicator of enforcement of property rights 
protection. It takes the value of 1 when 
property rights are very well protected and 
7 when security of property rights is not 
ensured 
 
Economic Freedom of the  World 
(2010) 
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II. COUNTRY LIST 
Argentina Denmark** Israel** Norway** South Africa 
Australia** Estonia* Italy ** Panama Spain** 
Austria** Finland ** Korea Rep.** Paraguay Sweden** 
Belgium** France** Kuwait Philippines Switzwerland** 
Bolivia Germany** Latvia* Poland* Thailand 
Brazil Greece** Lithuania Portugal** Uganda 
Bulgaria Hungary* Malaysia Romania Ukraine 
Canada** Iceland** Malta* Russia United Kingdom** 
China 
Colombia 
Cyprus* 
Czech Rep* 
India 
Iran 
Ireland** 
 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Netherlands** 
 
Singapore* 
Slovak Rep* 
Slovenia* 
 
United States** 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
*High-Income countries (according to the ATLAS classification system) 
** OECD economies included in the robustness analysis panel 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
The Coefficient of Variation (C.o.V.) is calculated across a two year rolling window; its measure is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the rolling window. A backward 
looking strategy has been used
17
 to reflect the type of knowledge agents might have of volatility at 
time t, which is attained by comparing the volatility levels prevailed at time t-1 with those of time t. 
The standard deviation is calculated according to the following formula:   
 
                                                          (1) 
 
Whereas the C.o.V. is obtained as: 
 
                                            
17 i.e. real volatility for year 2000 has been calculate across the two year period corresponding to 1999 and 
2000; that of 2001 uses information from 2000 and 2001 and so on. 
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Where σ is the standard deviation as defined in (1) and µ is the mean calculated across a two-year 
rolling window. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. MIN MAX OBS. 
BUSINESSR&D 0.674    0.7     0.000028  3.40 585 
GOVERR&D 0.45      0.25   0.02   1.18 542 
GDPPC 12525  11632 193.5 56639 811 
GDPPCHI 11030 12382 2271.3 56639 811 
INTRATE 9.7  12.7 0.128 130.7 680 
EXCHRATE 288 985.7 0.03 11786 815 
BALANCE   -0.88 4 -21.5 23.4 578 
TRADEOPEN 0.9 0.62 0.15 4.38 803 
POLINSTABILITY 4.7 5.2 0 21 741 
LOGGDPCOV 0.3 0.26 0.0002 2.79 812 
INTRATECOV 0.52 2.2 0.0005 45.9 675 
EXCHRATECOV 0.06 0.09 0 0.84 815 
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Table 2. 
     FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOGGDPt-2 -0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.088 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.2) 
-0.3 
(0.23) 
LOGGDPHIt-2 0.59*** 
(0.18) 
0.52*** 
(0.18) 
0.45** 
(0.2) 
0.44** 
(0.21) 
0.52** 
(0.21) 
GOVERR&Dt-2 0.21** 
(0.11) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
INTRATE -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
INTRATE
2 0.00005* 
(0.00003) 
0.00006** 
(0.00003) 
0.00008** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
EXCHRATE - 0.0001 
(0.00008) 
- 0.00008 
(0.00008) 
- 0.00008 
(0.00008) 
-0.00007 
(0.00008) 
-0.00007 
(0.00008) 
EXCHRATEEMU - 0.02 
(0.03) 
- 0.03 
(0.03) 
- 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.043) 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
TRADEOPEN 0.1 
(0.08) 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.183* 
(0.09) 
0.186* 
(0.1) 
BALANCE 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.1* 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
-0.16* 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.06) 
INTRATECOV   -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.0137** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
EXCHRATECOV    0.06 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU    -0.003 
(0.23) 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
POLINSTAB     -0.026* 
(0.013) 
N. Obs. 319 319 314 293 293 
N. Groups 57 57 57 53 53 
R
2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.25 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on FE. Column (5) corresponds to the specification 
described in equation (1).  
 *** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 3. 
         2SLS – FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOGGDPt-2 -0.22 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.18 
(0.19) 
-0.41 
(0.26) 
LOGGDPHI t-2 0.57*** 
(0.18) 
0.47*** 
(0.173) 
0.44** 
(0.17) 
0.44** 
(0.18) 
0.51*** 
(0.17) 
GOVERR&D t-2 0.64* 
(0.34) 
0.73** 
(0.35) 
0.75** 
(0.35) 
0.79** 
(0.38) 
0.82** 
(0.37) 
INTRATE -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
  -0.006** 
(0.002) 
    -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
INTRATE
2 0.00004** 
(0.00002) 
0.00006*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
EXCHRATE -0.00008 
(0.0001) 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
EXCHRATEEMU -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
-0.006 
(0.03) 
0.0004 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
TRADEOPEN 0.097 
(0.07) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.213** 
(0.094) 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
BALANCE 0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.175*** 
(0.06) 
-0.206*** 
(0.06) 
-0.21*** 
(0.065) 
INTRATECOV   -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
EXCHRATECOV    0.1 
(0.136) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU    -0.013 
(0.18) 
-0.034 
(0.17) 
POLINSTAB     -0.027* 
(0.016) 
N. Obs. 313 313 307 288 288 
N. Groups 51 51 50 48 48 
R
2 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.346 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on 2SLS-FE. Column (5) corresponds to the 
specification described in equation (1).  
*** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 4. 
                               2SLS – FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOGGDP t-2 -0.57** 
(0.25) 
-0.52** 
(0.26) 
0.18 
(0.2) 
LOGGDPHI t-2 0.6*** 
(0.17) 
0.47** 
(0.2) 
 
GOVERR&D t-2 0.7** 
(0.35) 
0.82** 
(0.4) 
0.8*** 
(0.13) 
INTRATE -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
INTRATE
2 0.00008*** 
(0.00003) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
EXCHRATE 0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.00001 
(0.00007) 
0.0003** 
(0.00008) 
EXCHRATEEMU -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(0.15) 
TRADEOPEN 0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.3*** 
(0.1) 
 
BALANCE 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.22* 
(0.14) 
INTRATECOV  -0.1*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
EXCHRATECOV  0.2 
(0.14) 
-0.3 
(0.27) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU  -0.12 
(0.2) 
0.23 
(0.7) 
POLINSTAB -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.16) 
 
XCONST   0.1 
(0.01) 
LOGGDPSTDEV -0.017*** 
             (0.6) 
  
 
INTRATESTDEV             -0.005* 
             (0.003) 
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EXCHRATESTDEV            -0.001** 
(0.0004) 
  
 
EXCHRATESTDEVEMU   0.007 
(0.0005) 
  
DEMOCRACY  0.001 
(0.01) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS   0.007 
(0.01) 
 
HIGHTECHEXP t-2  0.006 
(0.005) 
 
N. Obs. 308 280 336 
N. Groups 30 48 22 
R
2
 0.35 0.34 0.89 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on 2SLS-FE. Column (5) corresponds to the 
specification described in equation (1).  
*** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
 
